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Abstract: Floods are the most frequent category of disasters worldwide.  Among all 
geographical regions, Asia has suffered the most.  While there are several ongoing 
humanitarian efforts and initiatives, we believe there is a new opportunity to coordinate 
“last mile” humanitarian efforts in the event of a flood using micro-retailers. Because 
micro-retailers are the ‘last mile’ nodes in traditional retail supply chains in many Asian 
countries, we propose the use of social enterprise to buttress these supply chains for 
distribution of essential goods by coordinating with micro-retailers before and after 
floods. We also present a stylized model to quantify the benefits of doing so. 
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For the decade ending in 2010, floods accounted for nearly half of all natural disasters. 
Floods affected a large number of people especially in Asia: eight out of the ten deadliest 
floods worldwide from 2001-2010 occurred in Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh.  Despite 
the fact that the number of floods per year has been increasing exponentially since 1900, 
there is very little in the operations literature on humanitarian supply chains that deals 
with floods.  Unlike earthquakes, floods are more predictable in terms of timing and 
location.  Therefore, there is an opportunity to involve “local entities” for better 
preparedness and mitigation. Thus, we seek to answer the question: what type of supply 
chain can facilitate humanitarian relief and hasten economic recovery in case of floods, 
especially in the Asian context? 
τur proposed answer lies in “buttressing” traditional supply chains of essential goods 
to improve humanitarian relief and to aid economic recovery for all involved parties after 
the flood.1 Because micro-retailers are essentially the ‘last-mile’ nodes in retail supply 
chains in Asia,2 such buttressing would have to involve micro-retailers.  Our idea 
involves a (for-profit or not-for-profit) social enterprise that would coordinate preparation 
for and response to a flood. Specifically, the social enterprise would buy essential 
consumer goods from the upstream supply chain nodes (manufacturers/distributors) and 
pre-position inventory in temporarily leased earmarked spaces before an anticipated 
flood. It would replenish pre-registered micro-retailers during the flood and during the 
recovery period. Thus, the micro-retailers would be able to continue selling to their local 
customers, now ‘beneficiaries’ (i.e., flood affected individuals), who would pay for 
essential goods by using cash or certain vouchers provided by the government or 
international NGOs. When humanitarian aid stops, the traditional supply chain operations 
would be restored, and erstwhile beneficiaries can continue buying from the micro-
retailers who would replenish their stock from wholesalers as they did before the flood. 
We provide an ‘engineering’ solution that calls for the use of various “existing 
elements” of humanitarian efforts to develop local solutions for floods in Asia. Although 
our proposed solution is not fundamentally novel in itself, it does contribute to the 
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operations literature that has not delved much into the specifics of flood relief so far. We 
also contribute to the supply-chain literature via our notion of buttressed supply chains 
that use a “temporary” channel when the regular supply chain is disrupted. Additionally, 
we present a simple model to quantify the benefits of our proposed solution.  
2. The ͚Probleŵ͛ of Floods iŶ Asia 
In 2000, a billion people were living in areas vulnerable to a 100-year flood and it is 
expected to double by 2050 (UNU 2004).3 In Asia, the number of floods has been 
growing exponentially over 1910-2010 (Figure 1), impacting many people over the past 
century (Figure 2). Currently, there is a general belief that climate change will lead to 
more large-scale floods (e.g., the floods in North Korea (2012) and Thailand (2011)).  
Insert Figure 1 somewhere here 
 
Insert Figure 2 somewhere here 
 
 
Asia has been affected by more flood-related disasters than any other continent in the 
world, accounting for 228,000 deaths and 93% of all floods-related deaths in the world 
over the decade 1987-1997 (UNU 2004). This percentage rises to 99% if we consider the 
past 110 years (Table 1). Also, flood risks remain high in the same regions of Asia 




 Incidence Impact 
 Total # of 
events 
Total killed Total affected Estimated 
Damage 
Africa 22% 0% 2% 1% 
Americas 23% 0% 2% 16% 
Asia 37% 99% 96% 61% 
Europe 15% 0% 0% 19% 
Oceania 2% 0% 0% 3% 
Total % 100% 100% 100% 100% 
TOTAL  2,084   4.4 million   2.3 billion  US$ 344.5 billion  
 
Table 1: Incidence of general floods, not including flash floods or unspecified floods, and 
their impact in different continents over 1900-2012 (Source: EM-DAT: The 
OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database). 
 
Insert Figure 3 somewhere here 
 
 
As floods have essentially become an annual occurrence, the number of people 
affected each year is quite stable in large and populated countries like India and Indonesia 
(Figure 4) across the three decades from 1980-2010.  
Insert Figure 4 somewhere here 
 
 
Despite these statistics, a disproportionate amount of the operations (OR/ OM) 
literature on humanitarian supply chains has focused on earthquakes and international 
humanitarian efforts, which require solutions that originate outside the affected region. In 
contrast to earthquakes and droughts, local solutions can be developed for mitigation and 
preparedness for general floods (not including ‘flash’ floods). There are other pertinent 
differences too that imply that the humanitarian relief efforts for floods need to be 




 Earthquakes General floods Droughts 
Onset time Very fast Medium Very slow 
Origin of 
solutions 
Primarily external to 
the affected region 
Primarily local to the region 
except for rare floods where 
external solutions are needed 






Highly unpredictable in 
time as well as in 
location.  
Timing during the year is 
predictable and even intensity 
can be predicted with a few days 
of lead time using satellite 
imagery; locations can be 
identified as being more flood-
prone than others using 
historical data 
Prediction over long 
time, however, those 




Although some sites are 
more vulnerable than 
others, earthquake 
epicenter location can 
vary over a large area 
even if the earthquake 
entails the same 
tectonic plates 
In low lying areas along the 
river. Although, rivers used to 
change direction with floods, 
most rivers now have set 
boundaries owing to 
urbanization. 
Same areas year-after-
year – drought may go on 
for many years. 
People Generally stay where 
they are 
May need to be moved to non-
flooded areas 
Area too widespread for 
people to move; national 
boundaries get in the way 
Items needed Blankets and clothing, 
besides foods and water 
(could be in cold 
weather) 
Instant food and drinking water 
primarily; water-borne diseases 
are a major threat. 
Food and water. 
Transportation 
relief efforts 
Road, helicopter Road, boat, helicopter with ‘last 
mile’ efforts on foot, rubber 
boat, and even ox-carts. 
Internationally led 
traditional supply chains 




Could affect anyone, 
depending on location 
and type of housing.  
Primarily the ‘poor’ as it is 
generally the poorest who have 
to live in flood-prone areas in 
any city. 
The ‘poor’. 
Table 2: Some differences between earthquakes, general floods and droughts pertinent to 
humanitarian operations 
 
Economic recovery after a disaster remains a thorny problem. A full year after the 
2010 floods in Pakistan, over 1.6 million flood-affected individuals remained homeless 
despite the efforts of many humanitarian organizations.  UN Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO) warned that many displaced people in Pakistan would require help 
till 2013 with economic recovery a “distant dream” (Uσ 2011).  
6 
3. Existing Solutions 
Humanitarian relief operations often entail the involvement of the International 
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) along with their national 
societies, Oxfam and World Food Program (WFP) to carry out massive logistical efforts 
to help victims affected by any type of disaster including “massive” floods. We now 
examine these efforts from two perspectives: as supply chain flows and as disaster relief 
efforts, with an eventual aim to identify gaps in the existing solutions for flood relief. 
3.1 Supply Chain Flows for Flood Relief 
Because supply chain operations canonically comprise material flows, information flows 
and cash flows, we can examine existing humanitarian relief operations as follows: 
a) Material flows: NGOs are working with logistics providers for humanitarian relief.  
For example, WFP’s logistics operations in China, Myanmar, India, and Philippines are 
now supported by Logistics Emergency Teams (LETs) established by TNT, UPS, and 
Agility (Quinn 2010). For ‘last mile’ deliveries, there are reports of ox-drawn carts being 
used or volunteers wading through flooded areas to deliver supplies (USAID 2011 and 
Davis 2010).  Also, after the flood in Myanmar in 2008, WFP worked with the Logistics 
Cluster comprising 39 organizations using common logistics services to distribute first-
aid, food items and non-food items to beneficiaries using airplanes, helicopters, boats, all-
terrain vehicles, motorcycles and bicycles (Quinn 2010).  
b) Information flows: NGOs are using different Information Technologies to improve 
their humanitarian relief efforts.  Besides the use of census data and satellite images of 
the flood waters spreading in different areas to improve its relief efforts, WFP has utilized 
mobile phones with smartcards containing beneficiary identification to monitor and 
coordinate food distribution activities in India (Economist 2010).  In addition, WFP is 
exploring the use of beneficiaries’ biometric data (fingerprints, retina scans) to ensure fair 
food assistance (Yu 2010). Also, information technology such as GIS (Geographical 
Information Systems) and social media such as Twitter and Facebook can be used to 
organize local response efforts: Professor Quintus Jett of Dartmouth University described 
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a community project called MτSAIC σew τrleans that enabled ‘open-sourced’ groups to 
support the restoration of flood-damaged New Orleans neighborhoods in 2005.4 
c) Cash flows: An increasing number of international NGOs such as Oxfam and WFP are 
offering cash, vouchers (virtual cash), or cash-for-work vouchers to beneficiaries so that 
they can use them to buy food or other essentials. For example, in 2011, Oxfam 
distributed 1000-rupee (approx. US$10) vouchers to beneficiaries so they could buy 
foods from designated micro-retailers. Oxfam would then pay these micro-retailers for 
the cash value of the vouchers (Oxfam 2011).5 
In some developing countries such as Vietnam and Philippines, cash transactions 
between micro retailers and beneficiaries can be conducted via mobile money 
applications on their mobile phones (Ure and Lovelock 2007).  For example, WFP 
distributed electronic vouchers via mobile text messages to registered beneficiaries 
immediately after a typhoon landed in the Philippines in 2011 so that they could buy food 
from micro-retailers (Rosenberg 2011). By using mobile phones to conduct these 
transactions, WFP can reduce time and cost to distribute vouchers while increasing its 
track-and-trace capability and reducing frauds. Also, beneficiaries can receive these 
vouchers in a secure and fair manner, and micro-retailers reduce their cash-to-cash cycle.  
3.2 Disaster Relief Efforts for Flood Relief  
The σational Governors’ Association (σGA, 1979) lists a four-phase approach to 
managing disasters: (a) mitigation, (b) preparedness, (c) response, and (d) recovery.  
a) Mitigation. Governments play a significant role in mitigating flood risks by 
identifying areas prone to floods and by preventing development in these areas.  Also, 
governments can reduce flood risks by building dams, reservoirs, dikes, levees, flood 
channels, and approaches for flood risk management (cf. Schanze et al. 2006). Aligning 
public and private incentive is necessary to develop policies for reducing social and 
economic impact of floods. The resulting efforts could be economically beneficial for 
developments in flood-prone areas such as New Orleans (Loucks et al. 2008). 
b) Preparedness. Due to the predictability of timing and location of a flood, the 
following can be used to prepare for flood relief: 
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 Beneficiary identification:  To ensure that food assistance is distributed to the 
“right” beneficiaries after a natural disaster such as flood, one can develop 
identification cards by registering beneficiaries in advance using photos, 
fingerprints, or biometric information.  By doing so, NGOs can distribute food to 
registered beneficiaries quickly and prevent the issue of multiple registrations and 
other fraudulent activities.6 
 Terrain information:  Satellite imaging and weather forecasts already exist to 
identify populations vulnerable to an imminent flood. The next step is 
disseminating this information. WFP’s Emergency Preparedness and Response 
Web provides publicly available repository geo-referenced databases. These 
databases enable WFP to develop contingency and emergency plans, and logistic 
plans for distributing food items especially after a natural disaster (Yu 2010).  
 Stock pre-positioning: WFP’s Latin America and the Caribbean Emergency 
Preparedness and Response Network (LACERN) increased its capacity for storing 
and moving food rapidly within the region by pre-positioning equipment in 
Panama, and pre-positioning stocks of food and non-food items in Ecuador, El 
Salvador, and Barbados (Balletto and Wertheimer 2010).   
 Coordination: Developing a common ‘platform’ for information exchange and 
coordination across different entities is critical for flood relief. For example, the 
UN Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC) set up a bulletin service on its website to 
coordinate logistics activities (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2005).  
Coordination is needed for using scarce transportation resources during floods. 
For instance, in the 2000 floods in Mozambique, UNJLC managed to increase the 
number of flights and helicopter utilization across different parties through web-
based coordination (Samii and Van Wassenhove 2003). 
 Monitoring-and-advance-warning systems: Such systems use control charts to 
monitor water levels and issue an alert to people in flood-prone areas can be 
useful. WFP has co-developed an early warning web-based system called HEWS 
web to present latest bulletins and warnings on possible disasters in Asia, Africa 
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and Latin America (Balletto and Wertheimer 2010). Text-based flood warning 
variants can be conceived instead for use in urban areas. 
c) Response. Response time comprises: (1) time to detect (and locate) the disruption 
(e.g., flood), (2) time to design (or prescribe) a solution in response to the disruption, and 
(3) time to deploy the solution (Olshansky et al. 2012; Sodhi and Tang 2012: Chapter 
5).Detection time can be reduced by developing mechanisms to discover a risk incident 
quickly when it occurs or even to predict it before it occurs. Monitoring and advance 
warning systems help reduce the detection lead time. Design time can be reduced by 
improving preparedness so that all affected parties have well established contingent plans 
in advance as discussed in the previous subsection. Deployment time can be shortened by 
improving communication and coordination among the different entities, once a recovery 
plan has been selected.  Information and communications technology (ICT) can certainly 
help in reducing the deployment time, as for example with WFP distributing food 
vouchers to registered beneficiaries in the Philippines after the 2011 flood using text 
messages.  Yu (2010) describes how WFP uses ICT to deliver food assistance. 
d) Recovery. Governments and/or NGOs already leverage the supply chain expertise of 
the private sector for humanitarian relief especially logistics companies such as DHL 
(Gupta and Perupu 2008), TNT and UPS.  For example, UPS offered the Salvation Army 
“UPS track pads” to track and help confirm that each affected family received an 
appropriate amount of critical food and supplies after the Haiti earthquake in 2010 (Lynn 
2012).  While the private sector has been involved in humanitarian relief, it has not 
played a critical role in supporting economic recovery after a flood.  We believe that a 
more active private sector would hasten economic recovery because the private sector can 
help bringing in back jobs that were lost due to floods and restoring businesses that were 
disrupted by floods.7 
3.3. Gaps in the Existing Solutions  
We find three gaps in the existing solutions: (1) preparedness against floods that occur 
frequently especially at the ‘last mile’ areas, (2) response to medium-sized floods that do 
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not attract the attention of international NGOs or central government but create economic 
havoc for the people in the affected areas, and (3) recovery of the affected areas.  
 Firstly, there is a gap in preparedness efforts. As floods are affecting millions of 
people in many Asian countries, governments seek to strengthen flood defenses and 
invest in flood warning systems, and international NGOs invest in preparation against 
massive humanitarian disasters across countries. However, greater attention needs to be 
paid to preparedness at the ‘local’ level to ensure people continue to have access to 
essential goods during a flood. Given the recurrence and the predictable of general floods, 
such preparedness should be semi-permanent in nature rather than as a one-off event. 
Secondly, there is a gap in response as regards ‘medium-sized’ floods that are not 
large enough to attract the attention of the international or even national NGOs but these 
floods are still large enough to disrupt the local economy for extended periods of time. 
For a massive, say 50-yearflood with the 2% chance of occurrence in a given year, the 
central government or even international humanitarian relief organizations are likely to be 
involved in responding to the resulting humanitarian crisis.  For a small flood, e.g., a 5-
year flood with a 20% of occurrence in a given year, local communities in flood-prone 
areas have to devise local solutions to assist affected people until the flood waters recede.  
However, in case of a medium-sized 15-year flood, international or central government 
humanitarian relief is unlikely to be available. At the same time, local solutions would be 
inadequate because normal supply chain operations would be disrupted, and relief efforts 
would require a coordinated region-wide effort possibly involving NGOs, local 
government and manufacturers of essentially goods.  In this case, who should organize 
the response for medium-sized flood? 
Finally, while the effort of various parties to respond to disasters to contain the 
loss of lives is admirable, there continues to be a gap in solutions for economic recovery 
especially when the economic disruption and losses occur almost annually.  Economic 
solutions have to be tailored to the local economy. For instance, it is hard to conceive of a 
standard solution for economic recovery that would apply to both the UK floods of 2012 
and the Thai floods of 2011. 
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As such, we must consider the Asian context before we seek to address these three 
gaps. In developing countries in Asia, a typical supply chain has large (and small) 
manufacturers that include indigenous ones as well as subsidiaries of western 
manufacturers such as Cadbury (acquired by Kraft in 2010), Coca Cola, Pepsi, Procter & 
Gamble, and Unilever. The next downstream echelon in the traditional supply chain is the 
distributor, who buys from several manufacturers and sells to wholesalers. Finally, those 
buying from the wholesalers are primarily small-sized family-owned stores called kiranas 
in India as well as micro-retailers, i.e., roadside vendors and those selling off handcarts.8 
Our field visits in India revealed such micro-retailers barely make US$5/day for their 
families – even in expensive cities like New Delhi – selling small packets of drinkable 
water, cold drinks, cigarettes, small sachets of shampoos, etc. These micro-retailers are 
especially vulnerable to floods since they are deeply embedded in poor communities, 
which are especially vulnerable to floods. To make matters worse, any disruption can 
destroy what little they have. Specifically, the business operation of micro-retailers is 
disrupted during and after a flood in two ways: (a) the distribution of goods from 
distributors to micro-retailers is disrupted; and (b) the distribution of goods from micro-
retailers to flood victims is difficult owing to 'last mile’ considerations. 
This supply chain structure provides an opportunity. Besides coordinating with 
NGOs, local government, and upstream supply chain partners, coordinating with micro-
retailers is necessary because these micro-retailers have local knowledge – they play a 
dominate role in selling basic food and personal hygiene items to meet primary needs 
before a flood by reaching deep into rural areas.9  Also, by engaging these micro-retailers 
in flood relief efforts, they can continue their business operations soon after the flood, 
which would hasten economic recovery. 
4. Proposed Solution 
Keeping the aforementioned three gaps and the retail supply chain context in many Asian 
countries in mind, we now propose a solution: (1) to ensure that the distribution of goods 
to micro-retailers is not disrupted; and (2) to engage micro-retailers in flood relief efforts 
in a coordinated manner. Our proposed solution calls for buttressing existing traditional 
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supply chains by having a “social enterprise” to work with micro-retailers, benefitting 
from their reach into vulnerable communities with the relief.10 First we describe the 
general concept of our proposed solution before examining the issues arising from supply 
chain operations and relief efforts.  
To ensure that the availability of goods to micro-retailers is not disrupted during and 
after the flood, the social enterprise needs to do the following preparatory activities 
before the flood: 
To begin with, the social enterprise will need earmarked land in order to make 
temporary use of that space for setting up makeshift warehouses.  These warehouses will 
be used to replenish the inventories for micro-retailers during the flood. Such land use 
would have to be supported by the local government, for example, by earmarking public 
land such as parks or school playgrounds for defined periods of time commencing before 
and ending soon after a flood. Once the emergency is over, the use of makeshift 
warehouse space would end, but that space would remain earmarked for use in the next 
flood otherwise there is a danger that it could become a land-grab scheme by different 
parties including the social enterprise.  Note that our proposal is different from land set 
aside by governments for natural disasters in three ways. Firstly, we would like public (or 
private) land earmarked before, not during or after, a disaster to allow pre-placing 
inventory based on the anticipated intensity of the flood. Secondly, these plots of 
land/warehouse spaces should be small and distributed to allow for easy replenishment of 
goods to micro-retailers. Thirdly, the actual release of earmarked land by the local 
government to the social enterprise would be contingent on the anticipated intensity of 
the flood. 
Another preparatory activity for the social enterprise would be to buy goods directly 
from the manufacturers (or from large distributors) and deliver-and-sell to the micro-
retailers, using a temporary supply chain network of makeshift warehouses and flood-
appropriate transportation links for express use in the relief effort only just before, during, 
and just after a flood.11 
Furthermore, to engage micro-retailers in flood relief, the social enterprise should 
work with the regional government, manufacturers and micro-retailers to coordinate ‘last 
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mile’ effort to distribute essential goods. Specifically, the social enterprise can leverage 
the traditional retail supply chain that operates during normal times to quickly establish a 
temporary supply chain involving manufacturers/distributors and micro retailers during 
the abnormal time around a flood event.  After the flood related crisis issues subside, the 
regular supply chain should take over.  By engaging micro-retailers with local knowledge 
in rural areas, the social enterprise can enable these micro-retailers to resume their 
business operations soon after a flood.  
While there are additional logistics, communication, and coordination costs for 
establishing and operating the proposed temporary supply chain, buttressing can enable: 
(1) faster and more effective humanitarian relief because these micro-retailers are already 
embedded in the community of affected people; and (2) speedier economic recovery by 
helping the affected micro retailers restore their business operations quickly after a flood. 
We now examine our proposed solution through the lens of supply chain flows and 
disaster relief efforts. 
4.1 Supply-Chain Flows 
The buttressed supply chain evolves over four stages: (1) before the flood, a regular 
supply chain comprising manufacturers, distributors/wholesalers, and micro-retailers 
caters to consumers; (2) just before the flood, a buttressed supply chain with the social 
enterprise pre-positions inventory; (3) during the flood and the recovery period, the 
temporary supply chain run by the social enterprise supplies goods; and (4) after the 
recovery period, the regular supply chain is restored (Figure 5).  
 
Insert Figure 5 somewhere here 
 
For material flows, bulk shipping to the social enterprise’s makeshift warehouses for 
prepositioning inventory would be done by road (or other cheap transportation) before the 
flood.  During the flood, logistics providers will supply using helicopters if these 
warehouses cannot be reached by road. Distributing or selling small quantities of items to 
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or by micro-retailers during the disruption/recovery period will have to be done using 
small rubber boats, bicycles, ox-carts or wading through water. 
For information flows, census data and satellite images of the spreading flood water 
can be used to calculate the amount of product needed that can be ‘pushed’ to the micro-
retailers (using credit terms) just before the flood occurs. A social-enterprise coordinated 
replenishment of micro-entrepreneurs can leverage mobile technology to facilitate 
communication and coordination of various activities especially because mobile phones 
are ubiquitous in urban as well as rural areas in Asia (Economist 2010). 
For cash flows, there are three types: Firstly, the social enterprise will need funds or 
credit to buy goods from the manufacturers to pre-position inventory, to replenish the 
inventories during and immediately after the flood, and to cover its operating costs. 
Secondly, the micro-retailer will need credit for one- or two-days’ worth of goods from 
the social enterprise – if he cannot pay, the maximum amount the social enterprise would 
lose would be, say, two days’ worth of sales or about US $10-$20.Thirdly, the flood-
victims may become ‘beneficiaries’ of national or international humanitarian relief 
efforts. If the government or international NGOs like Oxfam or WFP give vouchers to 
flood beneficiaries, the social enterprise would ensure that it can take vouchers from 
micro-retailers, who in turn will take vouchers from the flood beneficiaries in exchange 
for essential goods. Mobile technology may also be used for cash transactions especially 
as doing so offers traceability and may prevent price gouging. 
4.2 The Disaster Relief Context 
We now examine the buttressed supply chain in terms of disaster relief efforts: 
Mitigation. The social enterprise has to mitigate two execution risks: trust and funding. 
Firstly, to ensure that it is trusted by all parties, the social enterprise can be the result of 
well-established non-government organizations like the IFRC, a local chapter of an 
international NGO like Red Cross or Oxfam working with ‘regionalized’ supply chains, 
or a consortium of manufacturers and/or distributors interesting in moving essential 
goods to consumers even during floods (Charles et al. 2011).  Secondly, if the social 
enterprise is based on one of these forms, it should have sufficient funds to buy goods 
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from the manufacturers to pre-position inventory, and to replenish the inventories during 
and immediately after the medium-sized flood.  Moreover, to mitigate the risk of product 
shortage during the flood, the social enterprise can make “contingent” contracts with the 
manufacturer (or distributor) in advance according to a pre-specified “n-year flood” plan. 
Preparedness. Before the flood, the social enterprise can use historical data to identify 
vulnerable areas and populations, help the select community to be aware of evacuation 
plans directly or through its network of micro-retailers. The social enterprise could use 
monitoring-and-advance-warning systems to monitor water levels and to issue alerts 
should any anomalies occur. Also, the social enterprise should register the micro-retailers 
of the select area before the flood and give them 1-2 days of credit during flood times. 
Also, the social enterprise needs to determine optimal locations for pre-positioning 
inventory before the flood. The pre-positioned inventory has to be near the micro-retailers 
so the social enterprise will have to consider multiple small locations contingent upon 
flood intensity. As regards to coordination, the proposed social enterprise has to work 
with various organizations (the government, NGOs, manufacturers, logistics service 
providers, micro-retailers) to define the roles and responsibilities and to improve 
communication and coordination when responding to flood-induced humanitarian crises.  
Response. Once the flood is known to be imminent along with its anticipated intensity, 
the social enterprise needs to manage its response. The social enterprise reduces design 
time for the solution as its plans are contingent upon flood intensity and through its 
communication channels with manufacturers as well as micro-retailers. The social 
enterprise also shortens deployment time by communication and coordination among 
supply chain entities including the manufacturers and the micro-retailers.  
Recovery. The justification for buttressing supply chains of essential goods is based on 
faster economic recovery of micro retailers. Moreover, the same benefits accrue to the 
manufacturers because the social enterprise provides an alternative channel during the 
disruption period. Because the micro retailer is not economically disrupted, his 
(economic) recovery is virtually immediate. The wholesalers and the distributors will 
recover when the buttressed supply chain is disbanded. 
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5. Quantifying the Benefits Using Stylized Modeling  
To quantify the value of buttressing a supply chain for flood relief, we now present a 
base model of a regular supply chain with its micro retailers located in a flood-prone area. 
Our focus is on the micro retailers and we are not considering the distributors and 
wholesalers. First we present a stylized model based on a traditional supply chain (§5.1) 
and then we analyze the value of buttressing this supply chain (§5.2). The model is 
simplistic and is intended only to highlight some of the decisions and parameters entailed 
in the buttressing to provide a basis for further research. 
5.1 A Base Case Model of a Traditional Supply Chain 
The traditional supply chain in our model comprises one manufacturer selling to 
independent distributors or wholesalers who sell to K micro-retailers, who in turn sell to 
poor consumers. The demand D in each period for each micro-retailer is assumed to be 
independent and normally distributed with mean μ and standard deviation ı. Although 
there are different ‘zones’ of flood-proneness depending on the flood intensity, we 
consider a single zone here for exposition. 
Consider the case when a flood occurs on day 0. Assume there is a probability a that a 
micro-retailer i will be “affected” by the flood in time period 0 so the number of affected 
micro-retailers N is binomially distributed. For the N affected micro-retailers, assume 
each is “disrupted” in the same way with probability d on any subsequent day after the 
flood. Hence, the disrupted duration after a flood T for retailer i is the first day that there 
is no disruption.12  Hence, T follows a Geometric distribution so that                           , where           . 
After the flood-related disruption is over at time T, assume that there is a “recovery 
period” of (θT) days after which the N affected micro-retailers can resume their business 
operations, where θ>1 is a parameter.  This assumption is based on empirical observation 
that recovery for floods is much longer than the disruption period. None of the N affected 
micro retailer will have any revenues for (1 + θ) T days after the flood.  Hence, the 
expected total sales loss to all affected micro retailers is equal to  σ (1 + θ) T D. Taking N 
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~ Binomial(K, a) and  D ~ σormal(μ, ı2)and assuming these random variables are 
independent of each other, we can compute the expected loss L= E[N(1 + θ) T D] to 
establish the following observation:  
Observation 1: Without buttressing the supply chain, the expected total loss in sales to 
the micro retailers after a flood is              , so that L increases with the 
disruption probability d. 
When relief agencies donate and distribute goods to the affected, these relief efforts 
reduce the need for the villagers to buy certain products from micro retailers after the 
flood.  Despite good intentions, these relief efforts can actually undermine the business 
and prolong economic recovery of the micro retailers (Oxfam 2011).13 As such, losses to 
micro-retailers may be more than those suggested by Observation 1. 
5.2 Modeling a Buttressed Supply Chain and Evaluating its Value 
A buttressed supply chain that involves social enterprises can be established quickly and 
operated on a temporary basis. The social enterprise would need to determine the amount 
of inventory to pre-place at those makeshift warehouses to enable the social enterprise to 
supply each affected micro retailers during the disruption period T.  However, because T 
is a random variable, it is practical for the social enterprise to first set a “target coverage 
period” Ĳ and then determine the corresponding inventory level to be pre-placed.  An 
immediate question is: How should the social enterprise determine the target coverage 
period Ĳ?  
To determine Ĳ; it is convenient to evaluate the target Ĳ based on its associated risk 
P{T>Ĳ}; i.e., the probability that micro-retailers’ operations will be disrupted even with 
buttressing in place.  Suppose we measure this “risk profile” associated with Ĳ according 
to 1/m so that          , where m is an auxiliary variable derived directly from Ĳ.  T 
is geometrically distributed so                          and         . By 
taking logarithm and by noting that   and         , we can transform our decision 
variable from Ĳ to  m  by using:  
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Observation 2: When operating the buttressed supply chain with risk profile 1/m, the 
corresponding target coverage period Ĳ is given by                     where  Ĳ is 
increasing d and m. Note that Ĳ > 0if and only if.m >  1/d. 
We focus on the case when m >  1/d  so that the target coverage period  Ĳ > 0 in the 
remainder of this section.  Noting that the number of affected micro retailers N ~ Bi(K, a), 
each of which faces per period demand D ~ σormal(μ, ı2), the amount of inventory to be 
pre-placed by the social enterprise associated with the target coverage period Ĳ is equal to  
E[N (1 + θ) Ĳ D]so that:  
Observation 3: When operating the buttressed supply chain with risk profile 1/m, the 
amount of pre-positioned inventory to be placed by the social enterprise is equal to   
Ka(1 + θ)Ĳμ, where                       
The above observation is based on the expected demand μ without accounting for 
demand uncertainty captured by the standard deviation ı.  If demand uncertainty is high, 
we can add safety stock to guarantee certain service level.  In that case, the amount of 
inventory to be pre-placed by the social enterprise with risk profile 1/m is equal to E[N (1 
+ θ) Ĳ D] +  k                   , where  k  is the safety factor.  By using the fact that                                                   for independent 
random variables X and Y, we can determine the corresponding inventory for the social 
enterprise easily; we omit the details.  To quantify inventory, we use days of inventory as 
a metric that is commonly used in practice.  
When the temporary supply chain adopts a plan based on the risk profile of 1/m, 
the social enterprise will pre-place its inventory so that each affected micro retailer will 
be able to continue their business operations if  T ≤ Ĳ ; hence,  the effective disruption 
period for each affected micro retailer is equal to max{(T – Ĳ), 0}.  Therefore, the 
temporary supply chain will reduce the disruption period for each affected micro retailer 
from T to max{(T – Ĳ), 0}.  Because T  ≤max{(T – Ĳ), 0} for any realization of  T, we can 
conclude that  E(T)  ≤ E[max{(T – Ĳ), 0}].  Also, the expected effective disruption period 
satisfies: 
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The last equality is due to the fact that          Note that the expected effective 
disruption period is increasing in the disruption probability, d. 
By establishing a temporary supply chain using social enterprises, the effective 
total loss in revenues to the micro retailers is  
L’=E[σ (1 + θ)                  D]. 
Noting that N ~ Binomial(K, a), D ~ σormal(μ, ı2), and the random variables are 
independent, we have: 
Observation 4: With the supply chain buttressed with a social enterprise, the expected 
total loss in sales to the micro-retailers after a flood is                                     . 
Comparing Observations 1and 4, it is clear that L’ < L  when  Ĳ > 0 (i.e., when we set m >  
1/d  as in Observation 2),and L’ = L when  Ĳ = 0so the temporary supply chain operations 
can help reduce the expected disruption period and the expected loss in sales to the 
affected micro retailers. 
 We now determine the optimal risk profile by determining m* that maximizes the 
economic benefit of the temporary supply chain for humanitarian relief and economic 
recovery.  Once we determine m*, we can apply Observation 3 to retrieve the 
corresponding optimal Ĳ*.  Suppose the unit cost for having the social enterprise to 
purchase, pre-place, and handling each unit of inventory at the makeshift warehouse is 
equal to c, and suppose the profit margin for micro retailers to sell each unit after the 
flood is equal to r.  Then we can apply Observations 1, 4 and 5 to show that:  
(1) The total expected cost for the social enterprise to handle the pre-placed inventory 
is equal to cKa(1 +  θ)                     , and 
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(2) The total expected savings due to reduction in sales loss is equal to r(L – L’) 
= r                         .   
Therefore, the expected economic benefit of establishing a temporary supply chain using 
social enterprise is equal to  
                                                    
By differentiating B with respect to n and by considering the first order condition, we can 
determine m* and then we can retrieve optimal Ĳ* using τbservation 3, getting: 
Observation 5: The optimal m* that maximizes the expected economic benefit associated 
with a buttressed supply chain B satisfies:                 , where  m*  is increasing in the 
disruption probability  d. Consequently,                                      
The benefits associated with the buttressed supply chain (in terms of reduction in 
disruption period, reduction in sales loss, etc.) would be even more if we account for the 
resulting bullwhip effect. 
6. Conclusions and Future Research 
We have proposed a temporary supply chain to buttress traditional supply chains in Asia 
that get disrupted during floods. Our solution involves a social enterprise for 
humanitarian relief and economic recovery caused by a flood. By using a stylized model, 
we have argued how all entities in the supply chain including consumers would be better 
off if a social enterprise were to deliver essential goods to micro-retailers just before, 
during, and just after a flood. Although our work builds on existing efforts of 
humanitarian organizations, much work remains to be done by way of future research:  
1. Innovative business models for social enterprises to deal with humanitarian efforts 
against floods and other disasters in a temporary supply chain setting. 
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2. Incentives of the different bodies – not just the supply chain entities but also the 
central and regional governments, NGOs, and relief agencies – to work together for 
the buttressed supply chain.  
3. Looking at the state-of-the-art hydrological literature on detecting floods and marking 
different regions with vulnerability to floods of different intensity. 
4. Land use policies for different types of land developments at different levels of flood 
intensity (e.g., Wheater and Evans 2009). 
5. Earmarking public land/warehousing space contingent on the expected timing and 
intensity of annual floods along with use of satellite images. 
6. Identifying multiple and small locations contingent on flood intensity for pre-
placement of inventory and other assets including floods-appropriate transportation. 
7. Pricing and incentives to ensure that the buttressing is temporary and so that micro 
retailers will switch to wholesalers after the recovery period. 
8. Contracts between the social enterprise and the manufacturers that are contingent 
upon the observed flood intensity. 
9. Extending our stylized modeling by incorporating multiple zones of different flood 
intensities, by refining the model on costs and benefits, by being cognizant of the 
hydrology literature as well as the topography of different regions and terrains. 
10. Case studies of flood-related disasters as well as humanitarian relief in these disasters.  
Humanitarian supply chains for flood disasters provide an increasingly important OM 
research opportunity that can benefit from existing humanitarian efforts and initiatives as 
well as research in fields as diverse as the civic society literature and hydrology. We hope 
we have whetted research appetite by presenting the ‘problem’ of floods in Asia, by 
highlighting elements of existing humanitarian supply chain efforts, by identifying a gap 
in these efforts and by outlining a possible ‘engineering’ solution for this gap. 
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Figure 1: Number of floods in Asia over the period 1910-2010 with an exponential 
trend line (Source: EM-DAT database from CRED, www.emdat.be, query run on 30th 







































































































































































Figure 2: Number of people affected by floods in Asia each year (left axis and bars) 
and the total population of Asia by year (right axis and trend line) (Source: EM-DAT 
database from CRED, www.emdat.be, query run on 28th April, 2012 on database 
version 12.07); there are some gaps in the floods data prior to 1955; population 





































































Number affected by floods in Asia and the total population of Asia by year (1910-2010)
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Figure 3: Asian flood risk in 2011 (darkened areas are high risk areas).  (Source: OCHA 






Figure 4: Logarithm (base 10) of total number of people affected every year in India 
and Indonesia; in most years during 1980-2011, hundreds of thousands (105) were 
affected in Indonesia and tens of millions (107) in India. (Source: EM-DAT: The 
OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database, www.emdat.be, query run on 30th 
















































































































































































Figure 5. Buttressing a regular supply chain for improving the relief and recovery 




                                                        
1We use the term buttressing motivated by the buttressing, or strengthening of levees, during floods. 
2Micro-retailers are small, independent, family owned businesses in developing countries. In India, 
micro-retailers account for over 90% of the retailing industry that involve over 40 million Indians.  
3An ǲn-year floodǳ is a measure of the ǲsizeǳ of a flood.  For example, a 100-year flood is calculated to 
be the level of flood water expected to be exceeded once in 100 years ((Holmes and Dinicola 2010). 
Thus, a 100-year flood corresponds to a 1% chance, the right-tail probability of the historical 
distribution of annual flood levels, that the level of flood water in any single year will exceed the level 
represented by a 100-year flood. Assuming each year to be independent as regards flood level, even 
two consecutive years may experience 100-year floods. 
4See a video at http://digitalstrategies.tuck.dartmouth.edu/media-library/radiotuck/open-source-
organizing/ 
5In the Sahel region of Africa, WFP managed to continue and integrate the vouchers into local market 
systems in 2006.  To prevent price gouging during floods, there are over 478,000 fair-price shops in various 
villages throughout India. India already uses “Maximum Retail Price” printed on the items. 
6In India and the Philippines, the beneficiary identification data can be stored in smartcards so that the 
relief workers can utilize mobile phones to distribute food, cash, vouchers, etc. after the flood. 
7Jose Holguin-Veras discusses the cooperation between major donors and local collaborative 
networks – these include churches and other local Ǯnetworkǯ organizations – based on his experience 
in Chile and Haiti in 2010 earthquakes. See: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?gl=GB&v=0gGxNSqwOX4. 
8While international retailers like Carrefour, Tesco, and Wal-Mart, as well as indigenous ones like 
Mother Dairy and Reliance are expanding slowly in India, the informal retail sector remains 
important even in developed economies like Korea. 
9During the Thai floods of 2011, many communities were short of many essential goods. 
Consequently, the Thai government announced the need to import three categories of goods: (1) 
drinking water and food items such as canned fish, eggs, sweetened condensed milk, soybean milk, 
UHT milk, instant noodles, instant foods, and fresh vegetables; (2) consumer products such as 
sanitary napkins, toilet paper, soap, toothpaste and toothbrushes; and (3) water purifiers and 
drinking water vending machines (MCOT, 2011). Other items include blankets, bed nets, and other 
ready to use supplementary food such as high-energy biscuits (HEB).  
10According to the UK Department of Trade & Industry, a social enterprise is a business with primarily 
social objectives whose surpluses are principally reinvested for that purpose, rather than being driven by the 
need to maximize profit for shareholders and owners. (DTi, 2002, p. 7)Such an enterprise can take one of 
many legal forms. For instance, in the UK, their legal status could be Community Interest Company, 
Company Limited by Guarantee, Company Limited by Shares, or an Industrial or Provident Society. Many 
also take charitable status. In practice, they may be cooperatives, credit unions, housing associations, 
community development trusts, social firms, and community businesses (SEL, 2012). 
11The notion of pre-positioning food and non-food items at designated logistics hubs for enhancing 
preparedness of humanitarian relief operations in Latin America and the Caribbean has been 
implemented in 2007 by WFP.  The reader is referred to Balleto and Wertheimer (2010) for details.   
12Here, all affected retailers are subject to the same disrupted duration T; however, the same 
approach can be used to analyze the case when different affected retailers i have different disrupted 
durations, Ti. 
13USAID, a US relief agency, created controversy in 2002 by offering African countries genetically modified corn; this was opposed on grounds it would Ǯcontaminateǯ the local seed and make African 
farmers dependent on a few large companies providing the seeds of genetically modified corn (BBC, 
2002). Thus, economic recovery could never be complete. See also Van Wassenhove and Tomasini 
(2004). 
